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Objectively Funny Jokes: 
Comedy’s El Dorado or a Simple MacGuffin? 
Mike Cundall 
 
Could there ever be an objectively funny 
joke or bit of humor? With the popularity of certain 
forms of humor, with the appearance of puns as 
consistent stages in the development of humor in 
children, this seems a reasonable query. Further, 
give recent developments in humor theory, and 
depending on what stance you take on what is 
essential to the funny or humorous your answer 
could be yes or no.  
Historically, given the prevailing theories of humor 
to date, the answer would have been a resounding 
‘no’. Whether you were a Hobbesian leviathan 
superior to all, or a Freudian fellow with your mental 
plumbing bound up like your mother’s panties 
(apologies for mixing my metaphors), or a callous 
incongruitest, the answer has to be nopety-nope. 
The unifying thread through these disparate 
theories, and others in the incongruity family, of 
which our esteemed Richard C. Richards is an elder 
statesman, who certainly won’t find this essay a 
worthy honor, is that humor is a consumer-sided 
event—a demand side theory. Humor is in the mind 
of the experiencer. If it turns out that arrangement 
of elements on the side of a building looked like a 
funny face, then it was funny. The very fact that 
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there is a needed cognitive appreciation by the 
receiver of the joke in order for humor to occur, 
settles the case. To imagine a universal joke that 
would elicit mirth from an individual is to tilt at 
windmills. It’s, in the immortal words of Vizzini, 
“inconceivable.” What one might find incongruous, 
or illustrative of superiority, or redirects my mental 
or neural plumbing to release laughter and humor, is 
specific to the individual. Cultures, individual 
histories are all too vast, too varied, dare I say, to 
incongruous, to expect that there be a joke pulled 
from the bowels of the comedy club that bestows 
upon the teller, like Excalibur to Artie, a guaranteed 
laugh.  
But there are new players on the field and 
we shan’t be bound to the mistaken theories of our 
forebears no matter how august the thinker (looking 
at you, Richards). So, let us give heed to a new brand 
of humor theory—a demand side approach. An 
approach that favors the would be joke creator, as 
opposed to the plebian audience. One, if accurate, 
would offer up an answer to our leading question in 
the positive. One that would not only tilt at the 
windmills, but actually knock ‘em down. One that 
finds the fountain of youth, and lays claim to the 
comic grail of the universally funny joke: an answer 
that would pierce the incongruous heart of darkness 
and bring forth the heart of gold. And what upstart 
could propose such a radical turning of the humor 
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theories on their respective ears? Why none other 
than our own Steven Gimbel. A man whose august 
status is rivaled only by the length of his hair.  
Exorbitant as Gimbel’s recent book, Isn’t 
that Clever? is, (he does claim to find El Dorado, so 
maybe it’s worth the gold) is a healthy and needed 
look at humor theorizing that incorporates 
philosophy of science (Hempel is grinning right now, 
though the irony is lost on Popper) and a careful 
attention to those who craft jokes (Gimbel is a 
studied and practiced comedian). Gimbel’s novel 
addition to humor theory is his focus on a 
shortcoming in the dominant theory of humor, the 
incongruity theory and his alternate theory of 
humor. Gimbel explores the worry that incongruity 
becomes a vacuous term or one that is drawn out so 
broadly as to be trivially true. It is what it is after all. 
Gimbel then presents an alternative theory that 
wants to focus not on the perception of humor, but 
on the object of humor itself. Instead of relying on 
some audience dullard to note the incongruity 
presented to them, Gimbel argues that humor is “An 
act is humorous if and only if it is an intentional, 
conspicuous act of playful cleverness.” (Gimbel, 
2017) This theory is of great relief to all failed comics 
out there (perhaps Gimbel is sublimating his rage?). 
For me, I now realize that I am damn humorous and 
my wife and all those students who heretofore have 
not “gotten” my jokes in class, well phooey on them.  
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Much of the power and support to be found 
for Gimbel’s approach comes from the attention he 
pays to how people discuss humor. He cleverly notes 
that many people recognize humor as such even 
when they do not find the humor on offer mirthful. 
To Gimbel’s mind, and rightly so it seems, this is a 
tacit recognition that while one didn’t find it funny, it 
still is humor, and hence humor is not simply a 
demand side event. To recognize something as 
humor, but a failed attempt, already shows that 
humor is not simply reliant on a chortle or guffaw to 
be real humor. And while laughs may pay the bills, 
humor is more indigent, or perhaps indignant. 
Apparently, I have been making jokes for a very long 
time. 
It’s worth exploring more what Gimbel 
notes about our language when we discuss humor. 
In the semi-rhetorical query “You’re joking right!?” 
one sees a glimmer of what humor really is. Gimbel 
notes that either way one answers supports his view 
that humor is a supply side phenomenon. If you 
respond in the negative, then it isn’t a joke, my mirth 
or laugh were it present is inappropriately placed. If I 
answer in the affirmative, then the laughter is 
proper. Were it the case that humor was truly 
subjective, then the answer given by the 
interrogated wouldn’t matter. My laughter or lack 
thereof would be proper only insofar as I found it 
funny or not. Come to think of it, this would make 
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current White House press briefings a whole lot 
easier. But to return to Gimbel’s point, the fact that 
it is perfectly sensible to discuss and assign a proper 
or improper response based on whether the 
utterance was taken as a joke or not, indicates that 
there is a whole lot more than simple subjectivity in 
humor. Humor is more than the cognitive 
achievement of the perceiver. There is an important 
and totally ignored part of the attempt at humor. A 
thing agreed upon, but sometimes failed to achieve. 
Kudos to Gimbel for this work.   
Now we’re running short of time and space 
for a Feschriften sort of article; well at least an LPS 
Feschriften. But, if as Gimbel notes, the study of 
humor is really now working as a mature science and 
is really into the puzzle solving phase, what we have 
here is a genuine puzzle. Humor is either a supply 
side, objective sort of phenomenon, or it’s a demand 
side, subjective phenomenon? I think there is some 
philosophical legerdemain in the way that Gimbel 
casts incongruity theorists as subjectivists, though I 
cannot for the moment clearly define why. But the 
truth is, his points about the recognition of failed 
humor are strong, which strongly indicates that 
there is something of great importance in the 
attempt to be funny.  
What I will suggest, in a hand-waivy, I-can’t-
be-held-responsible-for-clearly-saying-why-at-the-
moment sort of way, is that our discussions of 
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humor may be enriched if we approach humor as a 
success term. The best possible exemplar, 
paradigmatic humor if you will (damn you Tom 
Kuhn), would be a case where someone intends to 
be funny, using cleverness, and that the audience 
does indeed find the act to be humorous. If we set 
this as the best of all possible humor, then we can 
preserve elements of the incongruity theory worth 
preserving, as well an bring aboard Gimbel’s insight. 
The upshot of this is that this approach is supported 
by some of what is taken as a good characteristic of 
scientific theorizing, broad range. A theory that 
brings under one tent the supply side and the 
demand side covers more of the phenomena of 
humor. And this is a step in the right direction. Our 
honoree would surely applaud the maintenance of 
the need for incongruity, and our man responsible 
for the honors will be pleased. It also has the benefit 
of widening the scope of our research and 
maintaining some of our intuitions on what humor 
is. And if science has ever liked anything, it certainly 
has to be explanations that cover more. Am I right? 
 
